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Pursuing Native American Rights in
International Law Venues: A Jus Cogens




Through tatter'd clothes small vices do appear;
Robes and furr'd gowns lde all. Plate sm with gold,
And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks;
Arm it in rags, a pigmy's straw does pierce it.'
In a recent bestselling book, the late Joseph Campbell noted the
emergence of the "Gaia Principle," named for the goddess of the Earth,
under which scientists are beginning to view "the whole planet as an
organism." ' 2 Campbell saw m this principle the dawning of a new
"world myth," grounded in "the eye of reason, not of my nationality;
. not of my religious community; not of my linguistic com-
munity "3 Unfortunately, Campbell did not live to see his mytholog-
ical hypothesis become a social and political reality The rending of
the Iron Curtain, the unification of Europe, and the growing inter-
national economic interdependence indicate that the peoples of the
earth are becoming a world community 4 Even in the United States,
a country often criticized for its egocentnsm,5 the talk is of trade def-
icits with Japan, the destruction of the Equatorial Rain Forests, holes
in the Antarctic ozone. 6
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1987, San Francisco State Umversity. The author
would like to thank Karen Parker and Wiltrud Harms for their assistance, and Renee Cline
for her unending support.
1. W SHAxE EARE, King Lear, IV.vw. 162-65.
2. J. CowBELL wrrm B. MoyEis, THE PowER op MYTH 32 (1988).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Carter, A Fragile World Can Survive by Refurbishing Postwar Solutions,
Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1989, at AIS, col. 3 (observing the creation of "an international economic
community whose interdependence is far more total now than it was at the time of the Great
Depression").
5. See, e.g., infra note 309 and accompanying text.
6. See Sebemus, Of Red Ink and the Greenhouse, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 12, 1990,
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Global unity, however, requires global law. In no context is this
more apparent than in human rights. Graphic televised images of Tien-
anmen Square and Iraq, for example, show how far this new world
community has yet to go to ensure that each of its members receives
equal justice. Although the United Nations and the Organization of
American States (OAS)7 have created an impressive body of inter-
national human rights law, many nations have refused either to rec-
ognize or obey such law.8 "[V]iolations of the most fundamental rights
continue[] to cast a shadow, in all regions, on the conscience of hu-
manity."9
These human rights violations are neither limited to wholesale
massacres nor committed only by less-developed nations. This Note
will argue, for instance, that the United States Supreme Court decision
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association' vio-
at 19, col. 1 (addressing the huge international cost to reducing the "Greenhouse" effect, and
citing as contributory problems the burning of rain forests and the surprise "discovery of the
'Ozone Hole'); Sneider, Anti-Tokyo Feelings Bewilder Japan: America's New Scapegoat,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 22, 1989, at 1, col. I (noting the growing feelings among
Americans that Japan is becoming a "greater threat than the Soviet Union," in part due to
perceived unfair business practices); see also Carter, supra note 4, at col. 5 ("The U.S. could
not, even if it diverted all of its considerable resources, clean up its own air, water and land
by itself. What is done in other lands and hemispheres affects our environment in countless
ways.").
7. The Organization of American States (OAS) is an international organization
created by the states of this hemisphere to achieve an order of peace and justice, to
promote their solidarity, to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and
their independence. Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States
is a regional agency.
BAsIc DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN Rio=rrs IN THE INTER-AMERicAN SYsTEM, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.71/doc. 6 rev. 1, at 1 (1988) [hereinafter BAsic DocU tcrS]. The OAS seeks to arrive
at "pacific settlements" of disputes among member states and to promote their economic,
social, and cultural development through "cooperative action." Id. In the area of human
rights violations, for instance, the OAS General Assembly publishes the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights' findings of human rights violations by a member state if that
state has not rectified the violations. See infra notes 189-191 and accompanying text. The
General Assembly gives the violator state the opportunity to correct its actions voluntarily
before resorting to publication of the violations.
8. At the opening of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights' forty-sixth
session, the temporary chairman of the Commission observed that despite the recent favorable
developments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, many problems, including "ethnic and minority
tensions," have had "an adverse impact on human rights throughout the world." Commission
on Human Rights Forty-Sixth Session Summary Record of the 1st Meeting, at para. 11, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1990/SR.I (1990). The chairman concluded that the Commission must "make
its voice heard" more often on the "numerous occasions when human rights were violated,"
and that "it must be less concerned about the risks of displeasing Governments that violated
human rights and more concerned about the victims of those violations." Id. at para. 14.
9. Id. at para. 32 (statement of Mr. Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Human
Rights).
10. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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lated the international human rights of Native Americans. The Court
in Lyng upheld the United States Forest Service's authority to build
a logging road -through "land held sacred to three Native American
tribes (the Tribes), 1 even though the Court conceded that building the
logging road would effectively destroy the Tribes' ability to practice
their religion.'2 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan declared that
this ruling
sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along with
the spiritual well-being of its approximately 5,000 adherents, so that
the Forest Service can build a 6-mile segment of road that two lower
courts found had only the most marginal and speculative utility, both
to the Government itself and to the private lumber interests that might
conceivably use it.13
This Note argues that, whether or not Lyng was decided properly
under the free exercise clause of the first amendment, 4 Lyng violates
several of the Tribes' basic human rights as set forth in various inter-
national instruments. These rights are recognized under international
law as jus cogens, or fundamental, peremptory norms, which may not
be abrogated by any nation.' Lyng effectively authorizes the elimi-
nation of the practice of the Tribes' native religion, arguably the last
vestige of their culture. This Note argues that the prejudicial insen-
sitivity to Native American religions demonstrated by Lyng constitutes
11. The three tribes litigating the matter were the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa, Native
Californians who live in the Klamath area. For editorial convenience, this Note refers to these
tribes collectively as "the Tribes." This term distinguishes the litigants from this Note's more
general references to "Native Californians" and "tribes of the Kiamath River."
12. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-52.
13. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. Part II.B. of this Note joins the many scholars who have criticized the Lyng decision
under the first amendment. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: Leading Cases, 102 HARv. L. ,Rv.
143, 232-42 (1988); Note, Judicial Scrutiny of Native American Free Exercise Rights: Lyng
and the Decline of the Yoder Doctrine, 17 B.C. ENvrL. Ass. L. Rnv. 169 (1989) (authored
by Joshua Rievman); Casenote, Unjustified Interference of American Indian Religious Rights:
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 22 CpaoroN L. REv. 313 (1988)
(authored by Michele L. Seger); Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association: Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HAsrn.Gs CoNsT.
L.Q. 483 (1989) (authored by S. Alan Ray); Casenote, An Indian Site-Specific Religious Claim
Again Trips Over Judeo-Christian Stumbling Blocks (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988)), 5 J. LAND UsE & ENvTL. L. 293 (1989)
(authored by Anita Pryor & Gypsy Bailey); Note, New Directions in Sacred Land Claims:
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 29 NAT. REsorcEs J. 593 (1989)
(authored by Nancy Akins); Comment, Constitutional Law-Limitations Upon Protection Of-
fered by the Free Exercise Clause-Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988), 23 Susroix U.L. REv. 126 (1989) (authored by Mark A. Neweity).
15. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 334 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also Parker & Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling
the Law of Human Rights, 12 HAsTIrs INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 411, 414-15 (1989) (defining
jus cogens).
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a violation of the Tribes' rights to maintain their religion and culture
that could be characterized as a denial of self-determination, an act
of apartheid, and ultimately cultural genocide.
Members of the Tribes filed a petition 16 alleging these violations
before the OAS' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission), whose principal function is to promote the observance
and protection of human rights.'i The Commission has the power to
determine whether a governmental act such as a United States Supreme
Court decision violates the human rights standards that the United
States, by ratifying the OAS Charter, 18 has agreed to observe.' 9 In
finding a violation of international human rights law by the United
States in a previous case, 20 the Commission stated that
there is a limit on any State's ability to regulate a matter ... if the
result will violate international law. Domestic legislation of [OAS]
member states cannot validate conflict with international obligations;
a state cannot invoke its contrary domestic law as justification for
its failure to abide by an agreement. 2'
The Commission has the power to declare that the United States
violated the Tribes' rights, regardless of the Supreme Court ruling that
16. At the time of this writing, the Inter-American Commission had not yet heard this
petition. The Commission hoped to make a preliminary decision on how it would proceed at
its next regular meeting, scheduled for October 1990. Letter from David J. Padilla, Secretario
Ejecutivo Ajunto to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to Marilyn B. Miles,
Directing Attorney of the California Indian Legal Services (the organization filing the petition
on behalf of the Tribes) (May 29, 1990) (letter on file at the office of The Hastings Law
Journal).
Also pending at the time of this writing is a bill, H.R. 2566, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. §
5(b)(2)(H) (1990), that would make the strip of land set aside for the G-O Road protected
wilderness, foreclosing the building of that road. Passage of this bill would render any decision
by the Commission moot; therefore, the Commission probably would not make a determination
based upon the Tribes' petition if the bill is enacted into law. Although declaring the G-0
Road area protected wilderness would enable the Tribes' to perform their site-specific religious
ceremonies, it would not address the human rights violations that may be the progeny of the
Lyng decision.
17. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 1, at para. 1
[hereinafter IACHR Regulations], reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS, supra note 7, at 75-103.
18. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 13. The ratified Charter was deposited by the United States
with the Pan American Union on June 19, 1951. 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 9
O.A.S.T.S. 43. The United States deposited the amendments to the charter with the General
Secretariat of the OAS on April 26, 1968. 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 9 O.A.S.T.S.
88.
19. See infra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
20. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987)
[hereinafter Roach Death Penalty Case]. In this case, the Commission found that the United
States government violated fundamental human rights law by executing two 17-year-olds. Id.
para. 64-65, at 173. The Commission also reaffirmed that the United States' international
obligation as a member of the OAS "is governed by the Charter of the OAS (Bogota, 1948),
as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires on 27 February 1967." Id. para. 46, at 165.
21. Id. at 157.
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the governmental action did not violate the first amendment.Y Re-
course before the Commission is particularly appropriate for the Tribes
in light of the Commission's mandate that "special protection for in-
digenous populations constitutes a sacred commitment of the states."21
International attention to United States human rights violations may
be the only means of securing equitable treatment for the Tribes and
Native Americans in general, given the attitude of indifference and
hostility that Native Americans have encountered in this country. 24
A finding by the Commission that Lyng violates the Tribes' in-
ternational human rights would be particularly important for the
emerging world community. The potential for international organi-
zations to become viable venues for international dispute resolution
has never been greater.2s Focused attention on violations of human
rights by the United States and pressure to rectify the damage inflicted
by these violations are necessary to establish an effective enforcement
mechanism for human rights worldwide. The United States insists that
other nations comply with human rights standards and2 it has invoked
these standards in international forums in actions against other
nations.2 The United States, however, has ratified very few of the
major human rights treaties now in existence.7? Furthermore, the United
22. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988).
23. Report on the Work Accomplished by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights During its Twenty-Ninth Session, at 64, OEA/ser. L./V./II.29, doc. 40 rev. 1, (1972).
24. See infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment of
Native Californians, and infra notes 163-173 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
treatment of Native Americans generally.
25. See, e.g., Greenberger, U.N., Long Stymied by Cold War, Begins To Fulfill Its
Promise, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (observing that the United Nations "seems
poised to realize its potential, coming of age as a formidable instrument for resolving
international conflicts before they erupt into war").
26. In one month, for instance, the State Department of the United States called upon
the governments of Cuba, North Korea (Schifter, Human Rights Situation in Cuba, DEp'r ST.
BuLL., Oct. 1989, at 41-43), and Bulgaria (Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, Id. at 43), to comply
with international human rights standards.
27. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J.
3 (Final Order). In this suit against Iran, the United States claimed that the failure to provide
protection for United States nationals during the hostage taking at the Embassy was a violation
of fundamental rights:
The existence of such fundamental rights for all human beings gives rise to a
corresponding duty on the part of every State to respect and observe them as
reflected in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, regional conventions and
other instruments defining basic human rights ....
Comment, The Former American Hostages' Human Rights Claims Against Iran: Can They
Be Waived?, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 101, 112 (1981).
28. The United States has ratified only one of the many major human rights instruments
referred to in this Note: the Convention on the Crime and Punishment of the Crime of
January 1991]
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States Supreme Court recently ignored a jus cogens determination by
the Commission in holding that international standards of decency are
not dispositive. 29 The Commission's disapproval of Lyng would un-
derscore a crucial principle of international law: despite domestic ap-
proval of governmental actions, laws of jus cogens create a legal floor,
representing a minimum standard of human rights below which no
nation may drop.
This Note argues that the Lyng decision and the governmental
actions that preceded it constitute a human rights violation by the
United States and discusses the means of recourse available after such
a violation has occurred. Further, this Note hopes to demonstrate that
regardless of the restrictive view of constitutional rights that the cur-
rent Supreme Court supports, the United States government may not
deprive any citizen or group of citizens of certain fundamental rights.
Part I will begin by presenting a brief overview of the history and
scope of international human rights law. It then will present the factual
background of the Lyng decision, describing the religion of the Tribes,
the historical relationship of Native Californians with the encroaching
settlers, and the current status of the Tribes. Part II will analyze the
grounds for the Lyng decision, discussing the lower court rulings and
the Supreme Court's interpretation of its own first amendment de-
cisions. This historical and legal discussion will serve as the factual
basis for Part IV's argument that Lyng engendered international hu-
Genocide. See infra note 280. The Genocide Convention, although adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1948 in response to the horrors of the Holocaust, was not ratified
by the United States until February 1989. Id. Moreover, the United States refused to ratify it
completely, preferring instead to include modifications and understandings. Id. See also
Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Compar-
ative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HAsTmos L.J. 805, 810-11 (1990)
("Of the more than forty human rights agreements to which the U.S. could be a party,
however, it has ratified only twelve.").
29. In the Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20, the Inter-American Commission
found that the execution of minors, upheld by the Supreme Court, was a violation of
fundamental human rights law. Two years later the Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky,
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), held that a state imposition of the death penalty on minors (in this
case, a 16- and a 17-year-old) was not cruel or unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.
Id. at 2980. The majority emphasized "that it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive" in determining what is cruel or unusual punishment, and refused to consider the
sentencing practices of other nations. Id. at 2975 n. 1. The dissent would have looked to the
world community's overwhelming disapproval, among other sources, in finding that the
execution of minors is cruel and unusual. Id. at 2985-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Specifically,
the dissent cited three major human rights instruments supporting that position. Id. at 2985
n.10. The dissent also pointed out that the United States was responsible for three of the eight
executions of minors carried out worldwide during the previous ten years. Id. at 2985. Neither
the majority nor the dissent, however, recognized the condemnation in the Roach Death
Penalty Case of the United States' execution of minors.
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man rights violations. This discussion also will demonstrate how the
Lyng decision misinterprets both the Court's own prior first amend-
ment rulings and Congress' intent with regard to Native American
religious rights.
Part III will discuss briefly the procedures used to allege human
rights violations before the various. international tribunals and will
show that, generally, the Commission is the most appropriate forum
for United States citizens and groups seeking to make such allegations.
Part IV will examine the violations of fundamental human rights law
of the Inter-American system and fundamental international laws
against the prevention of self-determination, apartheid, and genocide.
By describing these violations, the Tribes' potential recourse before
the OAS, and the procedures necessary to obtain such recourse, this
Note hopes to inspire those who may find themselves faced with sim-
ilar violations by the United States government to pursue their rights
fully.
Finally, Part V will describe potential means of implementing in-
ternational human rights law into domestic jurisprudence and will ex-
plain why the United States must adhere-to international human rights
standards in its dealings with the Tribes and with all its citizens.
I. Legal and Historical Background
An understanding of the violations engendered by the Lyng de-
cision requires an understanding of both the law that the decision vi-
olated and the Tribes' culture and religion that the decision disrupted.
An appropriate starting point for this Note, therefore, is a discussion
of the nature of international human rights law and of the Tribes'
religion, culture, and history.
A. The Nature of International Human Rights Law
The foundations of international human rights law extend to the
natural law philosophy of Plato, Sophocles, and Cicero. 0 That human
rights are appropriate for international regulation, however, is a new
concept, and "most of what we now regard as 'international human
rights law' has emerged only since 1945," following the Holocaust.3 '
In part a response to the Nazi atrocities, the United Nations Charter
"established general obligations" requiring its member states to re-
30. Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 419-21.
31. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GuinD TO INTEMrATIONAL
HUMAN RITmS PRAcTICE 5 (H. Hannum ed. 1984).
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spect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.3 2 Since
the initial establishment of these rights, the United Nations and the
OAS have dramatically expanded their involvement33 in human rights,
both regionally and worldwide. Both have adopted numerous human
rights instruments and have created human rights commissions.34
The substance of international human rights law is derived from
two types of sources: 3" what might be called "treaty law," which in-
cludes the charters, treaties, and declarations adopted by the United
Nations, the OAS, and other international organizations that address
human rights;36 and customary international law, which is evidenced
by "widespread state practice." ' 37 Jus cogens is a superior subgroup
of customary international law. The term jus cogens is somewhat elu-
sive. 31 One international convention uses the term "peremptory
norm, ' 39 a term that reinforces its compelling, fundamental nature.4
Jus cogens also has been defined as "rules which derive[] from prin-
ciples that the legal conscience of mankind deem[s] absolutely essential
to coexistence in the international community. ' 41 Although this def-
inition focuses more upon the international effect of jus cogens rules,
they also have an individual effect; the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights,42 for instance, speaks of "inherent dignity" and "equal
and inalienable rights, ' 43 while the American Convention refers to
"essential rights."" A good working definition of a jus cogens law
32. Id.
33. This involvement by the United Nations and the OAS is both collective and separate.
For instance, although the OAS is a regional agency of the United Nations, see supra note 7,
and makes determinations based upon regional standards, see infra notes 198-200 and accom-
panying text (determination that execution of minors is a jus cogens violation in this hemisphere,
see, e.g., Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20), it also contributes to the body of
international instruments and writings that together establish jus cogens standards worldwide.
See infra notes 226, 284-287 and accompanying text.
34. Bilder, supra note 31, at 5.
35. See, e.g., R. LLLICH, INVOKING INTERNATIONAL HumA RIGmTs LAw IN DomEasic
COURTS 1 (1985) (describing the two sources of enforceable international human rights law in
United States domestic courts as treaties and customary international law).
36. Bilder, supra note 31, at 7.
37. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20, at para. 52.
38. Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 414-16.
39. Vienna Convention, supra note 15, art. 53, at 344.
40. Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 416-27.
41. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, at 294, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/11, UN. Sales No. E.68.V.7 (1969) (statement of Mr. Suarez, Mexican
delegate to the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties).
42. G.A. Res. 217(III)A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
43. Id. preamble, para. 1, at 71.
44. American Convention, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673, reprinted in BAsic DocuMarrs,
supra note 7, preamble, at 25.
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may be that it is "a peremptory norm of international law from which
no derogation is permitted." 45
The distinction between the treaty law and customary law is some-
what artificial; for example, a customary international norm often
derives from a standard common to the various international human
rights instruments and treaties. 6 The distinction is useful, however,
in determining how to allege a human rights violation by a nation.
To allege a treaty violation, a party must show that the suspect nation
ratified the treaty in question and intended for the treaty to be binding
law. 47 A customary international law violation may be alleged only
against a nation that has not protested that norm.46 A customary in-
ternational law that has achieved the status of jus cogens, however,
is binding on all states, whether or not they have protested that law.49
International human rights may be enforced at various levels, de-
pending upon the policy of the alleged violator nation regarding these
rights. Incorporating international human rights standards directly into
domestic law allows for enforcement by the most effective mechanism:
the domestic legal system.50 If the aggrieved party has not obtained
redress after exhausting domestic remedies, however, it may seek en-
forcement either at the interstate level (at which another nation pres-
sures the violating nation to cure the violation) or at the level of
international organizations such as the United Nations, the OAS, or
the Council of Europe.5'
The Tribes initially sought domestic redress for the violations of
their basic human rights. After being denied such redress by the Su-
preme court in Lyng, the tribes have taken their grievances to the
Commission. In order to understand fully the impact of the federal
government's actions on the Tribes, the inadequacy of the Supreme
Court's ruling, and the necessity for obtaining international redress,
a brief discussion of the Tribes' historical and cultural background
is helpful.
45. Id. para. 54.
46. See, e.g., infra notes 217-224, 260-265, 280-285 and accompanying text (defiing the
prohibitions against apartheid and genocide, in part by referencing various international human
rights instruments).
47. See, e.g., R. LmLcH, supra note 35, at 2 (stating that the enforceability of the United
Nations Charter human rights provisions in the United States turns on whether the Charter is
"self-executing").
48. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20, at para. 54.
49. Id.
50. Bilder, supra note 31, at 13.
51. Id. at 13-14.
January 1991] NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS
B. Historical and Cultural Background of the Tribes
The purpose of the Tribes' primary religious ceremonies, gen-
erally called "World Renewal, ' 52 is to renew or maintain the estab-
lished world and to protect mankind from disease. 3 The "World
Renewal" process begins with Tribal healers and leaders acquiring
spiritual power or "medicine" through "silent, solitary meditation in
the high country" of the Siskiyou Mountains.M This silent meditation
at specific locations is crucial for the "religious efficacy" of the cer-
emonies. 5 The Tribes also perform sacred dances56 in the "high coun-
try," the site of most of their religious ceremonies.5 7 Because the Tribes
believe that creative spirits live within these mountains, their religion
is site-specific."' The localization of the ceremonies is extreme: the
Tribes believe, for instance, that the sacred house in which they per-
form each religious ceremony has stood "since the time when there
were no men in the world. ' 59 This type of site-specific religion stands
in contrast to the many other religions that allow worship to take place
in any building of the same denomination throughout the world.6
The Tribes' connection with the Siskiyou Mountains extends be-
yond their religious practices to include their culture.61 For example,
the most desirable acorns and basket materials come from progres-
sively higher altitudes, houses placed higher on a hill indicate higher
social rank, and increases in height above the Klamath River corre-
spond to increases in both personal and medicinal power.6 2 Indeed,
52. D. Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gasquet-Orleans
Road, Six Rivers National Forest 45 (Apr. 9, 1979) [hereinafter Theodoratus Report] (available
as Appendix K to the Exhibits, Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795
F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986) (Civ. A. No. 83-2225), rev'd, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)). This report,
commissioned by the Forest Service, was compiled to determine the impact of the G-O road
upon the Tribes.
53. Id.; A.L. KROEBER, HANDBOOK OF TEE IND s OF CALIFoRNA 53 (1967).
54. Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Government
Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, supra note 14, at 485.
55. Id. at 485-86.
56. Theodoratus Report, supra note 52, at 45.
57. Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Government
Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, supra note 14, at 483, 485-86.
58. Id.
59. A.L. KROEBER, supra note 53, at 54.
60. Justice Brennan described this distinction well: "Where dogma lies at the heart of
western religions, Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use of the land." Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Protective Cemetery Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
61. Theodoratus Report, supra note 52, at 71.
62. For convenience, this Note often will refer to "culture" and "religion" collectively
as "religion." As this Note will show, international law protects both religion and culture,
making the distinction irrelevent.
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the Tribes have developed complex interrelationships between the land,
their culture, and their religion. For instance, the Tribes use sacred
power derived from the high country for medicinal purposes, 63 and
believe that sacred dances are necessary for bountiful fishing.64 Their
religious "origin stories are interwoven with events from daily life to
explain how things came about," 65 and their dances provide an op-
portunity for the wealthy members of the Tribe to display their prop-
erty.66 The Tribes' identity as peoples is bound up with the country
in which they live.
The white settlers of California, however, refused to recognize the
Tribes'.identification with the land. In fact, the treatment of the Tribes
and of other Native Californians by settlers and the state and federal
governments is hallmarked by its brutality. The encroachment of set-
tlers into California diminished the food supplies of many California
tribes. 67 When Native Californians throughout the state resorted to
petty theft out of hunger, the settlers began waging an "indiscriminate
war" on them. 6 Tribes in the Klamath River area, deprived of their
usual food sources by the encroachment and driven to the point of
starvation, resorted to killing white men and plundering for their food. 69
This resulted in an organized campaign by the settlers to kill the mem-
bers of those tribes.70 Military expeditions set out on "exciting Indian
hunt[s]." ' 71
The federal government recognized these atrocities and attempted,
* at least initially, to remedy them. In 1851, Redick McKee, one of three
California Indian agents appointed by President Fillmore, drafted five
treaties between the United States and northern California tribes, in-
63. Theodoratus Report, supra note 52, at 70.
64. Id. at 49.
65. Id. at 45-46.
66. A.L. KioaEER, supra note 53, at 54.
67. Letter from George Wooman and D.C. Johnson to Thomas J. Henley, Superintendent
of Indian Affairs in California (Mar. 25, 1855), reprinted in R. HImER, TEE DwsamucTroN op
CALwoRN INDANs 27-29 (1974). Further, many Native Californians were ravaged by venereal
disease introduced by the encroaching settlers. Letter from E.A. Stevenson, Special Indian
Agent, to Thomas J. Henley, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in California (Dec. 31, 1853),
reprinted in R. HmzER, supra, at 13-16. Other Native Californians were sold into slavery by
the settlers. Letter from William McDaniel and William McQueen to Thomas J. Henley,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in California (Oct. 4, 1854), reprinted in R. HEIMR, supra,
at 19-21.
68. Letter from Thomas J. Henley, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, California, to
Charles E. Mix (June 19, 1858), reprinted in R. Hmz, supra note 67, at 34-35.
69. Newspaper Editorial, Sacramento (1855), reprinted in R. HmzER, supra note 67, at
35-36.
70. Id.
71. Newspaper article, San Francisco (1864), reprinted in R. Hrmaz, supra note 67, at
97-99.
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cluding the Treaty of the Klamath on October Sixth. 72 A sample of
one of these treaties made by McKee with the native California tribes
indicates that the tribes were to relinquish title to their lands and place
themselves under United States jurisdiction. 73 In exchange, the United
States government was to set aside certain lands for the tribes' per-
manent use and occupancy and to provide the tribes with supplies,
horses, education, and training. 74 Mounting debt, fraud by Indian
agents, and growing sentiment against treaties, however, led the Joint
Senate and Assembly Committee on Indian Affairs to recommend op-
position to all California Indian treaties. 7 The United States Senate
rejected the treaties on the ground that the United States acquired
California from Mexico, which "regarded itself as the absolute and
unqualified owner of it," and thus the Native Californians "had no
usufructuary or other rights therein.' '76 Once rejected, these treaties
were placed in the Senate's secret files for more than fifty years. 77
Although the federal government recognized the sovereignty of the
tribes in the Klamath River area by instituting treaty negotiations, in
the end it retracted that recognition, apparently for reasons of ex-
pedience and public opinion.
The present status of Native Californians remains much the same.
More than one-third of the Native Californian tribes still are unre-
cognized by the federal government. 78 The Tribes are in particularly
dire straits. At a recent Senate hearing regarding the fate of certain
Yurok lands, Congressman Doug Bosco referred to the Yurok as "some
of the poorest people in our country, suffering unemployment rates
up to 60 percent, ' 79 and as "the poorest people in our State, ' 80 who
have yet to receive "funds due them from the government." 8
Poverty has not destroyed the Tribes' spirit. Although in poor
economic shape, they have kept their cultural heritage alive through
the practice of their religion. 82 The Lyng decision, however, would
72. See C. HoopEs, DOMESTiCATE OR EXTERMINATE: CAIJFORNIA INDIAN TREATIES UNRA-
TIMIED AND MADE SECRET IN 1852 at 60 (1975).
73. Id. at 122-24.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 82-96.
76. Id. at 106-07 (quoting William R. King, Senate Chairman of the Executive Committee).
77. Id. at 107.
78. California Indians Waging New Fight for Their Rights, San Francisco Chron., Jul.
9, 1990, at Al, col. 1, A6, col. 5 (discussing the Native Californians' pursuit of federal
recognition through legislation).
79. Hoopa-Yurok Indian Reservation, Hearing on S. 2723 Before the Senate Select Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1988) [hereinafter Yurok Reservation Hearing].
80. Id. at 31.
81. Id. at 30.
82. Theodoratus Report, supra note 52, at 69-71.
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permit the federal government effectively to strip away this last vestige
of their culture.
I. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association
In 1982, the United States Forest Service approved a plan to pave
six miles of dirt road for use by logging trucks between the towns of
Gasquet and Orleans (G-0 Road) traversing the Chimney Rock area
of California's Siskiyou Mountains, an area sacred to the Tribes.83 The
Forest Service decided to pave despite the recommendation of a pre-
liminary study, which the Service itself commissioned, that the road
not be built because it would "produce an irreparable impact on the
spiritual and physical well-being of the adjacent Yurok, Karok and
Tolowa communities"'  by destroying the solitude necessary for their
religious ceremonies .5
Members of the Tribes, environmental groups, and the State of
California sought a permanent injunction against the building of the
G-O Road and against the timber harvesting the Forest Service had
authorized.8 6 The members of the Tribes asserted that The Forest Ser-
vice's building the road through the Tribes' sacred grounds would vi-
olate their first amendment rights under the free exercise clause.8 7 The
district court agreed and held that the government's interests in build-
ing the road for logging purposes fell "far short" of those required
to justify the infringement on the Tribes' constitutional rights. 88
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld this part of
the district court's decision. 9 While the appeal was pending, the Forest
Service's compelling interest argument was substantially weakened:
Congress enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984,90 which placed
all of the high country, except the strip of land needed to build the
83. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
84. Theodoratus Report, supra note 52, at 422.
85. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
86. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
87. Id. at 590.
88. Id. at 596.
89. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 692-95 (9th
Cir. 1986). The court of appeals affirmed the district court's injunction of the building of the
G-O Road. It vacated, however, the portion of the district court's order that enjoined the
defendant from harvesting timber until an environmental impact statement could be prepared
and evaluated. Id. at 698.
90. Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984).
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G-O Road, in wilderness and "out of the reach of logging." 9' Based
upon this congressional act and the lower court findings, the appellate
court affirmed the permanent injunction of the building of the G-O
Road 2
A. The Supreme Court's Ruling
The Supreme Court also considered the conclusions of the Theo-
doratus Report and was willing to assume that building the G-O road
would "virtually destroy the ... Indians' ability to practice their re-
ligion."9 The Court reversed the lower court decisions, however, hold-
ing that "the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that
could justify upholding respondents' legal claims. ' 95
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon Bowen v.
Roy.9 In Roy, the Court stated that the free exercise clause does not
require the government to conduct its "internal affairs'"' in accor-
dance with the religious beliefs of its citizens. The free exercise clause
protects individuals from governmental compulsion but does not allow
them to dictate governmental conduct. 98 The Roy respondents chal-
lenged the Aid to Families with Dependent Children requirement that
prospective welfare recipients furnish state welfare agencies with Social
Security numbers for all household members as a condition of re-
ceiving benefits.9 The respondents contended that their daughter would
be robbed of her spirit if she obtained a Social Security number and
that the requirement therefore violated their first amendment rights. 100
Reasoning that the free exercise clause does not confer "a right to
dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures,"'' 0 the
Court held that the respondents could "no more prevail on [their]
religious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security num-
91. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 691. The Supreme Court in Lyng also noted that construction
of the G-O Road was optional under the California Wilderness Act, the exemption for
construction being granted only "if the responsible authorities so decide." Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (quoting S. REtp. No. 582, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1984)).
92. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 698.
93. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
94. Id. at 451-52.
95. Id. at 452.
96. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
97. Id. at 699.
98. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448 (interpreting Roy).
99. Roy, 476 U.S. at 695.
100. Id. at 695-96.
101. Id. at 700.
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ber... than [they] could on a sincere religious objection to the size
or color of the Government's filing cabinets."' 0 2
The Lyng majority held that the Forest Service's building of the
G-O Road could not be factually distinguished from the government's
use of a social security number in Roy. 10 3 The majority stated that the
"incidental effects"' 0 4 of a government program that do not coerce
individuals to act contrary to their religious beliefs may not compel
the government to justify its otherwise lawful actions. 105 Although
building the G-O Road would totally disrupt the Tribes' site-specific
religious practices, the first amendment, according, to the majority,
does not require the government "to satisfy every citizen's religious
needs and desires."'1' 6 The Court feared that a favorable ruling for the
Tribes effectively would allow anyone with a first amendment claim
to shut down governmental operations.2 7
The majority rejected the argument that building the G-O Road
would violate the Tribes' rights under the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (AIRFA),08 which the Tribes claimed supports their in-
terpretation of the first amendment.' °9 The majority held that the For-
est Service complied with AIRFA by choosing the least intrusive route
for the road, and ruled that AIRFA did not create a cause of action
for the Tribes."10
The discussion that follows not only will lay the groundwork for
a consideration of Lyng's potential jus cogens violations, which occur
regardless of the correctness of the decision from a constitutional
standpoint, but also will criticize the Lyng Court's first amendment
analysis.
B. The Constitutional Infirmity of Lyng
The majority's coercion standard"' for free exercise protection
can be seen as a departure from previous first amendment analysis.
An historical examination of the first amendment reveals that un-
derlying the free exercise clause is a principle of religious "volunta-
102. Id.
103. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
104. Id. at 450.
105. Id. at 450-51.
106. Id. at 452.
107. Id. at 452-53.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) (codifying the policy to protect and preserve Native Americans'
freedom to believe and express their traditional religions).
109. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
110. Id. at 454-55.
111. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
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rism,' 1 2 which guarantees "freedom of conscience by preventing any
degree of compulsion in matters of belief.""' Voluntarism suggests
that the free exercise clause was intended to prohibit "not only direct
compulsion but also any indirect coercion which might result from
subtle discrimination.""14 The Lyng coercion standard, by contrast,
appears to proscribe only direct compulsion. The Forest Service was
not enjoined from building the G-O Road because building the road
would only eliminate the religion indirectly, as opposed to directly
restraining the Tribes' ability to practice their religion by physically
keeping them from the land.
The majority's insensitivity toward and ignorance of Native
American religions is further evidenced by the Court's statement that
the Tribes' rights "do not divest the Government of its right to use
what is, after all, its land."'' 5 The Tribes held this land sacred before
a United States government existed, and the government obtained its
interest in the land only through its historical subjugation of the
Tribes.' 6 As Justice Brennan points out in his dissent, the majority's
statement indicates an insensitivity towards the conflict between west-
ern and Native American cultures, a conflict in which the dominant
western culture views the land in terms of ownership and use, and the
Native American culture views the land itself as sacred.Y7 The Tribes
sought only to preserve the natural solitude of the area, not to obtain
ownership rights."" The Lyng majority, however, does not recognize
any Tribal claim, legal or equitable, to the land.
Although grounded in prior decisions, the majority's coercion
standard can be seen as a deviation from its own application of the
coercion standard and thus departs from free exercise precedent. In
Sherbert v. Verner,19 the plaintiff challenged unemployment laws
compelling her to work on Saturdays against her religious beliefs. The
112. L. TRmE, AmRicAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1160 (1988). Professor Tribe bases his
historical discussion on the three opinions he perceives most greatly influenced the creation of
the first amendment: the evangelical view associated with Roger Williams (a view of "positive
toleration, imposing on the state the burden of fostering a climate conducive to all religion"),
the Jeffersonian view (espousing a "wall of separation between Church and State" to effect
the "complete separation of religion from politics"), and the Madisonian view (advancing
both religious and secular interests "by diffusing and decentralizing power so as to assure
competition among sects rather than dominance by any one"). Id. at 1158-59.
113. Id. at 1160.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Lyng, 485 U.S at 453.
116. See supra Part I.B.
117. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
119. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Sherbert Court established a two-prong test for determining free ex-
ercise violations. The test first examines if the'governmental act in
question places a burden on a person's ability to practice her relig-
ion. 20 If the act creates such a burden, it will- be found unconstitu-
tional unless the government has a compelling interest for the
infringement.1 21 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 122 the Court struck down com-
pulsory school attendance laws violating Amish religious practices.
The Court added to the Sherbert test the additional requirement that
a free exercise claim be based upon a genuine religious belief, rather
than a personal philosophy.'2 In restating this standard, Professor
Tribe lists four factors necessary for an exemption from a government
requirement:
(1) a sincerely held religious belief, which (2) conflicts with, and thus
is burdened by, the state requirement. Once the claimant has made
that showing, the burden shifts to the state. The state can prevail only
by demonstrating both that (3) the requirement pursues an unusually
important governmental goal, and that (4) an exemption would sub-
stantially hinder the fulfillment of the goal.'24
The facts in Lyng support a decision that the Tribes' first amend-
ment rights were violated under the Sherbert-Yoder analysis. First, the
Forest Service's own report found that the Tribes' beliefs are genuinely
religious. 12s Second, building the G-O Road places an impossible bur-
den on the Tribes' ability to perform their site-specific religious cer-
emonies by destroying the solitude of the area, threatening the complete
elimination of their religion.' 26 Finally, the government cannot dem-
onstrate any compelling interest that would justify imposing such a
burden, especially in light of the prohibition of timber harvesting in
the area surrounding the proposed logging road. 27
By focusing only upon the presence or absence of direct govern-
mental coercion, the Lyng majority seems to ignore the actual damage
to the Tribes' ability to practice their religion. This narrow focus con-
tradicts the Sherbert-Yoder test by failing to account for the mag-
nitude of the burden placed upon the Tribes' religion.128
120. Id. at 403.
121. Id. at 406; see also Casenote, Unjustified Interference, supra note 14, at 313, 321-22.
122. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
123. Id. at 215-16; see also Casenote, Unjustified Interference, supra note 14 at 322-23.
124. L. Tsar, supra note 112, at 1242.
125. See generally Theodoratus Report, supra note 52 (describing the Tribes' religious
practice that continues to this day).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 84, 94.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
128. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 468-69 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Lyng appears to mark the beginning of a trend in which the Supreme
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Furthermore, the majority's reliance on Bowen v. Roy 29 fails to
recognize the distinct nature of the government's interest in Roy. Roy
was decided in accordance with the Sherbert-Yoder standard: the gov-
ernment demonstrated a compelling interest in maintaining consistent
administrative records 130 and Roy's religious beliefs appeared to be as
personal and philosophical as they were genuinely religious.' 3' Sig-
nificantly, Roy only addressed the government's own internal pro-
cedures.132 Observing the importance of efficient recordkeeping, the
disturbance of which effectively could shut down the government, the
Court stated that the free exercise clause does not "require the Gov-
ernment to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with
the religious beliefs of particular citizens."'3 Building a logging road
through land that has been declared protected wilderness does not cre-
ate the kind of compelling governmental interest that justifies abro-
gating the Tribes' free exercise rights. 34 As Justice Brennan observed
in his Lyng dissent, " [f]ederal land-use decisions ... are likely to have
substantial external effects that government decisions concerning of-
fice furniture and information storage obviously will not. .... '"'I The
potential for the adverse impact of such land-use decisions upon Na-
Court is eliminating the Sherber-Yoder test. In Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), the
Court severely limited the Sherbert-Yoder analysis. The Smith Court held that members of a
Native American church could be fired and denied unemployment benefits for their religious
use of peyote. Oregon, 110 S. Ct. at 1606. Justice Scalia stated that the Court has "never
invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of
unemployment compensation" and that "in recent years [the Court has] abstained from
applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all." Oregon, 110
S. Ct. at 1602. Scalia cited Lyng as support for this reading of the Sherbert analysis. The
majority further held that the "first amendment's protection of religious liberty does not
require" applying a "compelling interest" test to governmental actions that restrict religious
practices. Oregon, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
Even Justice O'Connor, author of the Lyng opinion, stated in her concurrence that the
holding in Smith "dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence,
appears unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation's
fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty." Oregon, 110 S. Ct. at 1606 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring). This decision, together with Lyng, appears to be a dramatic step toward
a complete gutting of first amendment protection for Native Americans, whose religion,
perhaps more than any other, is often at odds with governmental actions.
129. 476 U.S. 693 (1985). For a discussion of the majority's reliance on Roy, see supra
notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
130. Roy, 476 U.S. at 707.
131. Appellee Roy had recently developed the religious objection to social security numbers
after consulting a tribal leader. Roy, co-appellee Miller, and their oldest daughter all had
social security numbers. Id. at 696 n.2.
132. Id. at 699.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
135. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 470-71 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tive Americans was recognized by Congress in AIRFA.13 6 In Brennan's
view, therefore, the comparison between purely internal governmental
record-keeping procedures and governmental land-use decisions, which
have broad external effects, appears "wholly untenable.113 7
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,3 8 decided after
Roy and before Lyng,139 reaffirmed the Sherbert-Yoder compelling
governmental interest standard. The Court in Hobbie rejected the Roy
standard, which would have required only a neutral and uniform ap-
plication of governmental benefits to allow denial of first amendment
protection. 40 *The Hobbie Court relied upon Justice O'Connor's dis-
sent in Roy, in which she stated that "[s]uch a test has no basis in
precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest
level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already
provides.' 141
Justice O'Connor's later majority opinion in Lyng is inconsistent
with her dissenting opinion in Roy, relied on in Hobbie. In Lyng,
O'Connor contended that the first amendment cannot deprive the gov-
ernment of iti right to build a logging road, even through land where
Congress has decided that "commercial activities such as timber har-
vesting are forbidden."' 42 In Roy, however, O'Connor insisted that
a governmental act be "especially important" before justifying its in-
fringement upon religious freedom. 43
This inconsistency suggests that the reasoning in the Lyng decision
was prompted more by the Court's admitted fear of future restrictions
on governmental land use' 44 than by its finding of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. The government's interest in managing the "vast
tracts of federal property"' 45 is certainly legitimate. It also is fore-
seeable that certain rulings protecting free exercise could lead to the
"de facto beneficial ownership" of federal property by private parties
as the Lyng majority feared. 46 The majority's finding of a compelling
government interest in this case, however, seems to represent an un-
justified prophylactic policy against possible Native American claims
to land held by the government. The court of appeals observed that
136. Id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 472 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. 480 U.S. 136 (1988).
139. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449-50.
140. Hobble, 480 U.S. at 141.
141. Id. at 141-42.
142. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 444.
143. Roy, 476 U.S. at 727 (O'Connor., J., dissenting).
144. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53.
145. Id. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 453.
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the Forest Service's interest in the G-O Road was not sufficiently im-
portant to outweigh the burden on the Tribes' religion. 147 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court "disclaim[ed] all responsibility for balancing these
competing and potentially irreconcilable interests"' 148 instead of de-
termining the Tribes' first amendment rights in accordance with free
exercise precedent.
Finally, the Lyng majority appears to misinterpret Congress' in-
tent in drafting AIRFA. AIRFA states that
it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express
and exercise [their] traditional religions .... including but not lim-
ited to access to sites ... and the freedom to worship through cer-
emonials and traditional rites. 149
This statement is an express application of the free exercise clause to
Native Americans, in which Congress recognized that its own policies
"could and often did 'intrud[e] upon [and] interfer[e] with' site-spe-
cific Native American religious ceremonies." 150 The legislative history
of the act indicates that AIRFA was designed to address the "[flack
of knowledge, unawareness, insensitivity, and neglect [which] are the
keynotes of the Federal Government's interaction with traditional In-
dian religions and cultures."'' The House acknowledged the failure
of non-Native American government officials to recognize critical dif-
ferences between Native American religion and other Western reli-
gions, noting the common perception "that because Indian religious
practices are different than their own that they somehow do not have
the same status as a 'real' religion."' 52
Although AIRFA arguably was not meant to create a private right
of action,'53 Justice Brennan pointed out in his Lyng dissent that it
is "an express congressional determination that federal land man-
agement decisions are not 'internal' government 'procedures,' but are
instead governmental actions that can and indeed are likely to burden
Native American religious practices."'15 4 The Court itself has noted
147. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
148. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
150. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 472 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Pub. L. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469
(1978)).
151. H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM N. NEws 1262, 1265 [hereinafter House REPORT]. See also Note, The First Amendment
and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: An Approach to Protecting Native American
Religion, 71 IowA L. REv. 869, 878 (1986) (authored by Diane Brazen Gould).
152. House REPORT, supra note 151, at 4.
153. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
154. Id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that Congress has the "necessary latitude to try new techniques ...
to accomplish remedial objectives"'' 55 and that the Court should ex-
ercise self-restraint in reviewing such congressional actions. 5 6 When
viewed as a congressional finding of fact., therefore, AIRFA should
be used to inform the 'Court's constitutional analyses of Native Amer-
icans' free exercise rights. 57
In addressing the purpose of AIRFA, a House of Representatives
report stated that "[tihe issue is not ownership or protection of the
lands involved. Rather, it is a straightforward question of access in
order to worship and perform the necessary rites. '15 The Lyng ma-
jority, however, focused on exactly the issue that the House report
deemed irrelevant: governmental ownership of the Chimney Rock
area. 59 After Lyng, ownership, and ownership alone, is the issue. Fur-
thermore, although the majority pointed out the Forest Service's "so-
licitous" approach to the problem by choosing the route that was the
farthest removed from the religious sites,16° the Court ignored the fact
that, regardless of the route chosen, building the G-O Road effectively
would eliminate the Tribes' ability to practice their religion.' 6' This
also is contrary to the congressional intent that access to sites be pro-
vided "in order to worship," not merely to look around. 62
By creating a standard for interpreting the free exercise clause that
emphasizes the government's property rights over religious rights, Lyng
creates a bleak future for Native American religious rights. Because
155. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980).
156. Id.
157. See Note, supra note 151, at 873-77.
158. HousE REPoRT, supra note 151, at 2 (emphasis added).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 144-148.
160. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 454.
161. See Theodoratus Report, supra note 52, at 422.
162. House REPORT, supra note 151, at 2. The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs
held a hearing on Native American religious freedom shortly after Lyng was decided. Improve-
ment of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: Hearing on S. 2250 Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,'100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-41 (1988). In introducing proposed
amendments to AIRFA, Senator Inouye, chairman of the Committee and co-sponsor of the
bill, stated that the Lyng decision "could undermine the ability of traditional cultures in our
land to exercise essential practices." Id. at 2. The committee therefore felt it appropriate to
reexamine AIRFA. Id. Senator Alan Cranston, co-sponsor of the bill, observed that although
"[tlen years have passed since passage of the American Indian Religi6us Freedom Act ...
[f]ederal land management policies remain insensitive to Indian religions and cultural tradi-
tions .... ." Id. at 9. The proposed amendment to AIRFA stated that "[e]xcept in cases
involving compelling governmental interests of the highest order, Federal lands that have been
historically indispensable to a traditional America [sic] Indian religion shall not be managed
in a manner that would seriously impair or interfere with the exercise or practice of such
traditional American Indian religion." Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). Although this bill ultimately
was not enacted into law, the Committee's introduction of this bill is further evidence that
Lyng violated the original intent of AIRFA.
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western religions are not as susceptible to government intrusions re-
lating to land use,163 the Lyng decision, by granting superior rights in
land-use decisions over freedom of religion, arguably has prejudicially
burdened Native Americans.
This prejudicial standard is demonstrated in Yonkers Racing Corp.
v. City of Yonkers, 16 a federal appellate court decision relying in part
on Lyng. 16S The Yonkers Racing court considered a case in which the
City of Yonkers sought to acquire two acres of land on the border
of a seminary's forty-four-acre property to comply with Department
of Housing and Urban Development standards for public housing. The
district court permitted the city to pursue eminent domain proceedings
against the seminary.'6 The seminary argued that those proceedings
would violate its rights under the first amendment because the two
acres formed an 'apron' of quietude" 167 surrounding the seminary,
contributing an atmosphere of quiet reflection essential to the devel-
opment of young men preparing for the priesthood. 6 It was further
argued that the city's acquisition of the two-acre site would substan-
tially affect the seminary's work. 69
The Yonkers Racing court applied the Lyng coercion standard to
the eminent domain proceedings and granted relief to the seminary.170
The court distinguished the seemingly indistinguishable factual situa-
tions in Lyng and in Yonkers Racing by stating that "the government's
use of its property involves significantly different considerations than
the taking by the government of privately-owned religious prop-
erty.'1 7 Although the intrusion on the seminary's religious practice
was less severe than that in Lyng, given that the eminent domain pro-
ceedings would not have eliminated the seminarians' ability to practice
Catholicism, the court granted first amendment protection to the sem-
inary simply because it owned the property that was the subject of
the dispute.
The Yonkers Racing decision illustrates the defective and possibly
politically motivated nature of the Lyng coercion standard. When
property is at the center of the dispute (as it will be for any site-specific
163. If the government were to close a particular Christian church, for instance, its
parishioners most likely could attend services at another church of the same denomination.
164. 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1988).
165. Id. at 870-71.
166. Id. at 861.
167. Id. at 869-70 (quoting Monsignor Edwin O'Brien, Rector at St. Joseph's Seminary
and College in Yonkers, New York).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 868.
171. Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
religion) the effect of that standard is to grant relief under the first
amendment based not on the scope of intrusion into religious prac-
tices, but on the ownership of property in question. Native Americans
necessarily will be discriminated'against under such a standard because
the government controls much of the Native American sacred land:
either it actually owns the land (as in the Chimney Rock area), or it
may arbitrarily terminate a tribe's right to enjoy such lands. 172 Lyng,
therefore, presents little hope to Native Americans of ever receiving
equitable treatment under the first amendment.173
This hostile domestic environment makes redress for Native
Americans through international venues important. The Tribes have
filed a petition with the Commission, alleging violations of their in-
ternational human rights. Although this action may be rendered moot
by pending legislative action that would provide relief for the Tribes, 174
the discussion that follows is important for groups that may be faced
with similar violations of their human rights by domestic courts in the
future.
III. Pursuing International Redress: Filing an Action Before
The Commission
The Commission is particularly appropriate for United States cit-
izens or groups of citizens who are seeking international redress for
human rights violations. In fact, other venues may not be available
to these individuals and groups. For instance, the International Court
of Justice in The Hague is open only to parties that are member coun-
tries of the United Nations. 75 It will not accept complaints from in-
172. Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contemporary International Law, 62 OR. L.
REv. 73, 113-14 (1983). Barsh observes that the "tribes' right to enjoy aboriginal lands depends
today to some extent on 'recognition' by the United States and may be terminated, with .more
or less compensation, at the pleasure of Congress for any purpose, including the protection
of non-Indian trespassers and private profit." Id. "In this scheme, tribes enjoy only what has
not yet been taken away, which cannot properly be described as a 'right' at all." Id. at 103.
173. Another example of the application of this discriminatory standard is United States
v. Means, 858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988), another decision based in part upon Lyng. The Means
court, in denying a group of Sioux Indians a special use permit for the establishment of a
religious camp, relied upon the fear in Lyng of granting de facto ownership of government-
owned land to Native Americans. Id. at 407. This decision was somewhat less egregious than
Lyng only because the court found that the site upon which the Sioux wished to establish
their camp did not have specific religious significance to them. Id. at 407 n.4.
174. See supra note 16.
175. INDIAN LAW REsouRCE CEN, INrD Rionrs-HumA RIGHTs: HANDBOOK FOR
INDIANs ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGrTs ComPLANTr PROCEDURES 22-23 (1984) [hereinafter
INDuN Ri irrs HANDBooK].
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dividuals or groups.176 Similarly, the complaint procedure before the
International Labor Organization, an agency of the United Nations,
is open only to governments, trade unions, and employee associations,
or delegates to the International Labor Conference. 177
Even those international procedures that are open to individuals
often are not practical for hearing certain types of violations. For ex-
ample, the United Nations has established a procedure, 7 8 involving
"the entire hierarchy of the UN's human rights organs,"' 179 that is
"designed for consideration of systematic, massive violations of hu-
man rights.' ' 8 0 Because complaints under the "1503 procedure" will
not be considered if they address only individual or isolated violations
of rights,'18 and because most of the proceedings "are kept secret from
the public and from the party who filed the complaint,"'' 8 2 this 1503
procedure most likely is "not the way to get Indian [or individual]
human rights concerns before the highest United Nations bodies.'1 83
Although complaints are allowed under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 184 complaints may be made only against
"those countries which have ratified the 'Optional Protocol' to the
Covenant. 85 The United States is not one of those countries. 86
Because of these restrictions, the complaint procedure before the
Commission "may be the most convenient and useful international
procedure for Indians" and for United States individuals with inter-
national grievances against the United States. 187 For this reason, and
because the Tribes actually have filed a petition before the Commis-




177. Swepston, Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International Labor Organi-
zation, in GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGns PRAcncE 74-75 (H. Hannum ed. 1984);
see also infra note 246 (describing the International Labor Organization).
178. E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. IA) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1.
179. Shelton, Individual Complaint Machinery Under the United Nations 1503 Procedure
and the Optional Protocol on Civil and Political Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RPinTS PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 60.
180. Id.
181. INDIAN RiGms HANDBOOK, supra note 175, at 32.
182. Id. at 33.
183. Id. at 34.
184. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
185. INDIAN RiGHTs HANDBOOK, supra note 175, at 36. The United States, however, has
not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See infra note 216 for a
discussion of international findings under that Covenant.
186. See Strossen, supra note 28, at 810 n.20.
187. INDIAN RiGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 175 at 38.
188. The other international procedures discussed are available in certain cases, and all
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The Commission has the authority to hear petitions containing
allegations of human rights violations by OAS member states.8 9 If the
Commission finds that violations have occurred, it will recommend
remedial measures to the member state in violation.' 9° If the member
state does not adopt the Commission's recommended measures, the
Commission may publish its decision in its annual report to the OAS
General Assembly.' 9' Publication means unfavorable publicity for the
violator. 192 Additionally, the Commission's investigation into the al-
legations gives notice to the member state that an impartial, inter-
governmental body has taken an interest in its actions.1 93 A published
human rights violation finding by the Commission can be more than
a moral victory for the petitioner because it publicly denounces, the
member state's actions, which may result in that state curing the vi-
olation.194
The following regulations of the Commission describe the pro-
cedures for petitioning the Commission. "Human rights," for pur-
poses of filing before the Commission, are set forth in two
documents: 95"the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention),' 96 and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man (American Declaration). 97 A petitioner first must ascertain
whether the member state accused of the violation is a party to the
American Convention.9 " If the member state is not a party to the
American Convention, then the petitioner's complaint must be based
upon a violation of rights contained in the American Declaration.'"
potential venues should be considered when seeking international redress for human rights
violations. For a more comprehensive discussion of these venues, see generally GumB To
INTERNATioNAL HumAN RIGrHrs PRAcTicE, supra note 31; and IND 4 Riasms HANDBOOK, supra
note 175.
189. IACHR Regulations, supra note 17, art. 51, at 94.
190. Id. art. 53(1), at 94.
191. Id. art. 53(4), at 94.
192. Norris, Bringing Human Rights Petitions Before the Inter-American Commission,'20
SANTA CtA.A L. REv. 733, 753 (1980).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 1(2), reprinted in
BAsic DocuEN-rs, supra note 7, at 65.
196. Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673, reprinted in Basic Documents, supra note 7, at 25-53.
The United States signed this Convention but never ratified it.
197. May 2, 1948, reprinted in BAsic DocummTs, supra note 7, at 17-24.
198. Norris, supra note 192, at 735.
199. Id. The filing procedure is as follows: any person, group of people, or legally
recognized nongovernmental organization may submit a petition to the Commission, alleging
violations of the human rights contained either in the American Convention or the American
Declaration. L4CHR Regulations, supra note 17, art. 26(1), at 84. The petitioner must identify
herself, the victim, the member state charged with the violation, and the nature of the
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Because the United States is not a party to the American Con-
vention, allegations of United States violations must be framed in terms
of the provisions of the American Declaration. The language of the
American Declaration, however, is necessarily broad; it declares in-
alienable rights, 2°° as the United States Constitution does. The Com-
mission therefore often will look outside the document to determine
the scope of the rights in question. Although the Commission looks
first to OAS instruments for a statement of legal rights that is pertinent
to the complaint submitted, it also may look to other pertinent in-
ternational documents.201
The Commission also may consider violations of either customary
international law or jus cogens, laws which may be found in any or
all of the major international human rights instruments of the world. 2 2
The Commission has identified four elements of a norm of customary
international law. 213 First, there must be a "concordant practice by
a number of states with reference to a type of situation falling within
the domain of international relations." 2°4 Second, there must be "a
continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period
of time." 25 Third, there must be "a conception that the practice is
complaint. Id. art. 32, at 86; see also Norris, supra note 192, at 740 (describing the filing
procedure and containing a sample first paragraph for a petition). The complaint must contain
a statement of facts, describing the act being denounced and the place and date of the alleged
violations. IACHR Regulations, supra note 17, art. 32(b), at 86. The petition also must state
that all remedies under domestic law have been exhausted. Id. art. 32(d), at 86; id. art. 37,
at 88. Finally, the petition should state that the subject of the petition is not pending settlement
before another international governmental organization, id. art. 39, at 89, and that the filing
is timely. Id. art, 38, at 89.
200. For example, the preamble to the American Declaration states that "[a]ll men are
born free and equal, in dignity and in rights, and, being endowed by nature with reason and
conscience, they should conduct themselves as brothers one to another." American Declaration,
supra note 197, preamble, para. 1.
201. See, e.g., Case 7615, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 24, 31, OEA/ser. L./V./II.66, doc. 10 rev.
1 (1985) [hereinafter Yanomami Indian Case] (citing the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 184, in determining that the government of Brazil had violated
the human rights of an indigenous population, the Yanomami Indians, as set forth in the
American Declaration).
202. INDN RiGnrs HANBooK, supra note 175, at 38. Even though a nation may not be
bound by a document such as the American Convention because it has not ratified that
document, the presence of a right in an international instrument such as the American
Convention is evidence that that right has achieved jus cogens status. See supra notes 37-46
and accompanying text. Universal jurisdiction is created for violations of a group's right to
self-determination, apartheid (Apartheid Convention, infra note 260, art. 5), and genocide
(Genocide Convention, infra note 280, art. VI, at 280). Therefore, the Commission may hear
complaints alleging such violations.
203. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20, at 166.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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required by or consistent with prevailing international law."26 Finally,
there must be "general acquiescence in the practice by other states. ' 2°
Once a finding has been made that a law is a customary norm, the
next step is to find that it has achieved the status of jus cogens for
it to bind a state that protests the norm.208 The Commission has adopted
the definition of jus cogens from the Vienna Convention 2° as "a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character." 210 Once the Commission has found
that a customary norm is jus cogens, no derogation of that norm is
permitted. 211
Under these international standards, the United States govern-
ment's actions can be seen as violations of the Tribes' fundamental
human rights, rights that are jus cogens.
IV. Specific International Human Rights Violations in the
Lyng Decision
The Lyng decision essentially violates the Tribes' right to self-de-
termination and commits apartheid and genocide. These are violations
of group, rather than individual, rights. Before discussing the vAol-
ations of specific rights belonging to the Tribes, therefore, it may be
helpful to discuss the collective nature generally of the rights of in-
digenous peoples.
A panel of experts supported by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") recently observed
that "[tihe notion of peoples' and human rights are distinct. Although
each is an aspect of the international 'rights' debate, and each ulti-
mately impinges on individual human beings, the two concepts should
not be confused. ' ' 212 The two are interrelated, however: "A full en-
joyment of individual human rights will not be possible if the people,
of whom the individual is one, is denied its rights .... ,,213 This dis-
tinction is particularly important for indigenous populations. For ex-
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 168.
209. See supra note 15.
210. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20, at 168 & n.2.
211. Id. at 168.
212. International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the concept of the Rights of
Peoples, at para. 14, UN Doe. SHS-89/CONF.602/7 (1990).
213. Id.
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ample, the panel of experts observed that nations "may exhibit
indifference to minorities within its borders, particularly where a mi-
nority is a powerless indigenous people whose rights come into ap-
parent conflict with the perceived needs of economic development.' '214
As the statements by these experts suggest, any discussion of the rights
of indigenous peoples (such as any Native American tribe) must be
framed at least partially in terms of their group, rather than individual,
rights. This may lead to confusion and conflict in the United States
legal environment, one that emphasizes the rights of individuals.2 15
It is important also to recognize that the rights of indigenous po-
pulations under international law must be reevaluated continually, and
in light of new domestic developments, to ensure that continuing en-
croachment into ancestral lands does not constitute a violation of those
rights. For instance, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
recently determined that the Canadian government had violated the
right to culture of an indigenous population by leasing the tribe's land
for a commercial timber project.21 6
As this discussion suggests, the recognition and protection of in-
digenous peoples' group rights requires a sensitivity that the United
States government has not demonstrated, either historically or in cur-
rent actions such as the Lyng decision. This kind of insensitivity can
result in violations of the basic human rights of indigenous peoples
such as the Tribes. Perhaps the most basic of these violations is the
214. Id. para. 4. The validity of any determinations by UNESCO in this field probably
will be questioned by the United States because it has withdrawn from that organization.
Specifically, "reservations about the concept of peoples' rights as discussed in the context of
UNESCO were amongst the reasons given for [that] withdrawal." Id. at para. 14.
215. The United States, however, insisted that language ensuring the human rights of
peoples, as opposed to states, be included in the United Nations Charter, and the State
Department itself has admitted the presence of a right of self-determination. Id. paras. 17-18.
216. Decisions, Communication No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990).
The tribe in question, the Lubicon Lake Band, is a "self-identified, relatively autonomous,
socio-cultural and economic group" living in Northern Alberta that "speak[s] Cree as [its]
primary language." Id. at 2. The Lubicon Lake Band alleged that the Canadian government
leased virtually all of the traditional Lubicon land for a commercial timber project. Id. at 22.
The Lubicon Lake Band also alleged that "[tihis economic activity, if proceeding unabated,
would ... continue to destroy the traditional lifeground of the Lubicon community." Id. at
23. The United Nations Human Rights Committee found that the "recent developments" of
the commercial timber projects, as well as historical inequities, "threaten the way of life and
culture of the Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation" of the band's right to culture
"so long as they continue." Id. at 29. The United Nations Human Rights Committee determined
that the acts of the Canadian government were violations under Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id.
Unfortunately, the Tribes may not raise similar allegations because the United States has
not ratified that Covenant. See supra note 186. The determination by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee is important to the Tribes, however, to the extent that it reinforces
the rights of indigenous populations to culture under international law.
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failure to recognize the existence of the group at all: the denial of the
group's right to self-determination.
A. Lyng: Denial of the Tribes' Right to Self-Determination
The right to self-determination is the collective right of a people
to choose their political status and to pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development freely without discrimination on the grounds
of race, religion, or color.217 Although the right to self-determination
was centered initially on the rights of a people to be free from co-
lonialism and to pursue their own sovereignty and economic devel-
opment, 218 the right consistently is extended to include the social and
cultural aspects of a people.21 9
Because the right to self-determination profoundly affects the lives
of peoples, it has been invoked more than any other charter principle
of international law. 220 Articles of the American Declaration pro-
moting the right to self-determination include those setting forth the
right to equality before the law, 22' the right to religious freedom and
worship, 2m the right to the benefit of culture,m and the right to the
use of free time to pursue spiritual, cultural, and physical benefit.2 4
The right to self-determination has been emphatically labelled jus
cogens by Special Rapporteur Mr. Gros Espiell, author of a landmark
report on the subject. 225 Moreover, because it is featured prominently
in major United Nations human rights instruments, it fits the Com-
mission's description of a customary norm of international law; it is
required by international law and it has been continually practiced,
or its practice has been acquiesced to, by most of the nations of the
world. 2 Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
217. A. CRrTscu, THE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION at 32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
404/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XIV.3 (1981).
218. Id. at 44-45.
219. Id. at 45.
220. American Declaration, supra note 197, art. II, at 18.
221. Id. art. III, at 19.
222. Id. art. XIII, at 20.
223. Id. art. XV, at 21.
224. It figures prominently in the United Nations Charter, U.N. CHmRa art. 1, para. 2,
art. 55; it is the first right set out in the two major international treaties, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 184, art. 1; and it appears
prominently in many other international instruments. H. GRos ESPIEL, Tn RGHT To SELF-
DETERMINATION: ImPLEMENTATON or Uturmn NATIONS RESOLUTIONS at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XIV.5 (1980).
225. H. GRos Espma, supra note 224, at 11-13.
226. Mr. Critescu observes that the member states of the United Nations pledge, in Article
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Law has stated that systematic racial discrimination, a term that can
be used to describe a violation of the right to self-determination, violates
jus cogens.227
An important threshold question in determining whether a group
may claim a violation of its right to self-determination is whether or
not it is a "people."2' Recent United Nations actions provide the an-
swer to that question for the Tribes. In 1982, the United Nations Ec-
onomic and Social Council established the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations. 229 Mr. Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Special Rap-
porteur of the Working Group, defined indigenous populations as those
that have an historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories and, consequently, consider
56 of the United Nations Charter, "'to take joint and separate action in co-operation with
the Organization' for the purpose inter alia of developing universal respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms" including the right to self-determination. A. CsuTEscu, supra note
217, para. 219-20.
227. RESTATEMENT (TrIMa) oF FOREIGN RmATioNs LAw § 702, cl. (f) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEmENT (THmn)].
228. This is not a simple question. In his landmark report on the right to self-determination,
Hector Gros Espiell, Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, observes that characterizing rights as collective
and possessed by peoples raises awkward theoretical problems. H. GRos EsPEELL, supra note
224, at 9-10. His solution is to avoid the problem by viewing self-determination as a right
primarily belonging to individuals. Id. at 9.
Mr. Aureliu Critescu, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, addresses this distinction differently.
A. CmnrEscu, supra note 217. Mr. Critescu observes that the right to self-determination could
be turned into a weapon against a state's territorial integrity and unity if it encourages
secessionist movements in the territory of independent states. Id. at 40. Noting the import of
this fear with regard to minorities invoking the right, he cites the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), which states:
"nothing [in the Declaration regarding principles of self-determination of peoples]
shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign
and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed
of a government representing a whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour."
Id.
As Mr. Critescu's report demonstrates, the definition of "peoples" can be particularly
problematic. Under a "territorial integrity [and] political unity" argument, if Native Americans
are found to be a minority rather than a people, the United States would have wider latitude
to enforce (or not to enforce) Native Americans' international human rights.
229. E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, 1982 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 26, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82
(1982). The Working Group was established specifically to "give special attention to the
evolution of standards concerning the rights of indigenous populations, taking account of both
the similarities and the differences in the situations and aspirations of indigenous populations
throughout the world." Id. at 27.
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themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing
in those territories.230
The Tribes have historical continuity with the Chimney Rock area:
they historically have used, and continue to use the Chimney Rock area
for sacred and ceremonial purposes.Y1 The Forest Service's archae-
ological research indicates that the prehistory of northwest California
(which includes the Chimney Rock area), as distinguished from other
parts of the state, is unique.3 2 Furthermore, the Tribes currently are
involved in negotiations with the United States government to establish
their own lands as a reservation.23 This demonstrates their desire to
distinguish themselves physically from society around them. Under
Mr. Martinez Cobo's definition, therefore, the Tribes are an indig-
enous population. As an "indigenous population," the Tribes are
"peoples" as defined by the United Nations Working Group on In-
digenous Populations . 4
The Tribes need not rely on international standards alone to es-
tablish themselves as peoples. The Supreme Court historically has rec-
ognized Native Americans as peoples. In 1831, Chief Justice Marshall
stated:
[t]he numerous treaties made with [the various tribes] by the United
States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations
of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for
any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed
230. J. MARTINnz COBO, STUDY oF THs PROBLEM OF DIscRIINATIoN AGAiNsT INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS at 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3
(1987). "Historical continuity" consists of one or more of the following factors: occupation
of ancestral lands, or at least part of them; common ancestry with the original occupants of
these lands; culture in general, or in specific manifestations such as religion; language; residence
in certain parts of the country; and other relevant factors. Id.
231. See Theodoratus Report, supra note 52, at 416.
232. Id. at 417.
233. See generally Yurok Reservation Hearing, supra note 79 (describing the Yurok efforts
to have certain lands set aside as a Yurok reservation).
234. The Working Group has since adopted the term "indigenous peoples" rather than
"indigenous populations." Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, at 18, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24 (1988) [hereinafter Sixth Session Report]. This "crucial" distinction
was reaffirmed in a United Nations seminar on the effects of racial discrimination on indigenous
peoples. Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22
(1989) [hereinafter Seminar Report]. During the general discussion at the seminar, the "greater
tendency to favour the term 'indigenous peoples' over the term 'indigenous populations',
especially as it reinforces the right to self-determination" was noted. Id. The seminar report
stated categorically that "[ijndigenous peoples are not racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities." Id. at 11. The seminar report concluded that "[i]ndigenous identity and cultural
survival has been threatened through the deprecation and suppression of indigenous languages,
spiritual and religious practices." Id. at 10. Whatever the distinction is between "minorities"
and "peoples," see supra note 228, indigenous populations are "peoples" and should receive
international human rights protection.
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on the citizens of the United States by any individual in their com-
munity .... 235
The Court has continued to follow this characterization in recent
cases.
23 6
Furthermore, federal control over Native American tribes does
undermine their status as peoples.137 Although Congress claims the
authority under its plenary power to remove certain aspects of Native
American sovereignty, Native American tribes are still "unique ag-
gregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their mem-
bers and their territory. ' 238 The historical treatment of Native
Californians indicates that the federal government has recognized them
as peoples. 2 9 Because the Tribes are peoples both under international
law and as recognized by the United States government, they are en-
titled to the right of self-determination.
The right to self-determination is not limited to the right to po-
litical and economic autonomy;2m it also implies recognition of a peo-
ple's right to regain, enjoy, and enrich its cultural heritage.2' This is
significant for Native Americans and the Tribes in particular. These
peoples are not in a position to seek political or economic independ-
ence because they have little if any control over their ancestral lands.
Mr. Martinez Cobo concluded:
[u]ntil the sacred lands, places and sites of indigenous populations
are returned to them so that they may keep and care for them in
accordance with their norms, such populations must be guaranteed
access to the sacred lands and places and to the natural products of
such places which are necessary for their religious practices. Access
to such products must be facilitated and exempted to the greatest
possible extent from the effect of limitations, restrictions or controls
imposed on such areas for other justified reasonsY2
235. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
236. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)
(stating that a treaty between the United States and a Native American tribe is essentially a
contract between two sovereign nations).
237. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (stating that although they are
subject to federal control, Native Americans remain a separate people with the power to
regulate their social relations).
238. Id. at 323.
239. In 1851 the federal government negotiated treaties with Native Californians and began
to establish reservations for them, as they did with many other Native American tribes. See
supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. The negotiations were broken off, however, due to
a lack of funds and because the population of Native Californians drastically decreased. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 218-219.
241. H. GROS ESPiELL, supra note 224, at 77; see also A. CRrrEscu, supra note 217, at
102 (defining culture as "the sum total of material and spiritual values created by man in the
process of socio-historical evolution").
242. J. MARTINEZ COBO, supra note 230, ch. XV, at 43.
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Although the G-O road would not eliminate the Tribes' physical access
to the sacred land, the road would affect the "natural products" of
the land by altering its physical nature.2 3 Specifically, the solitude of
Chimney Rock, which the G-0 Road would destroy, is such a "natural
product."
In an effort to secure guaranteed access, the Draft Indigenous
Rights Declaration sets forth "[tihe right to manifest, teach, practice
and observe their own religious traditions and ceremonies, and to
maintain, protect and have access to sacred sites" for indigenous peo-
ples.244 Further, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 245
adopted by the International Labour Conference, 24 recognizes the as-
pirations of indigenous populations to "maintain and develop their
identities, languages and religions," ' 247 and mandates government re-
spect for "the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values"
that are tied to land occupied by indigenous populations.Z8
The Commission has recognized this right to culture for indig-
enous populations. In 1985, the Commission found that the govern-
ment of Brazil had violated the international human rights of the
Yanomami Indians. 9 Interestingly, the violation began when the gov-
ernment built a road through Yanomami land. 0 The Commission
noted that "international law in its present state ... recognizes the
right of ethnic groups to special protection on their use of their own
language, for the practice of their own religion, and, in general, for
243. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
244. Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/
25 (1988) [hereinafter Draft Against Indigenous Rights Declaration]. A first reading of this
paragraph might suggest that the Lyng decision does not violate this right because Lyng does
not prevent access. However, the clause, "access to sacred sites ... for these purposes," id.
(emphasis added), discloses the decision's fault. Because the Tribes cannot worship at the site,
they no longer have spiritual access to it.
245. Convention Concering [sic] Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
Jun. 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention]. The
United Nations Economic and Social Council recognized that this convention was "carried out
in full collaboration and consultation with United Nations agencies and other concerned bodies,
particularly the Working Group on indigenous populations of the Subcommission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities." Implementation of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/1990/9 (1990).
246. The International Labor Conference is composed of representatives of member states
to the International Labor Organization (ILO), and is one of the ILO's three organs. Swepston,
supra note 177, at 75. The ILO was established in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles, and is
the only surviving element of the'League of Nations. Id. at 74. It became a specialized agency
of the United Nations in 1945, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969. Id. at 75.
247. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, supra note 245, preamble, at 1384.
248. Id. art. 13, at 1387. See generally id. arts. 13-19, at 1387-88.
249. Yanomami Indian Case, supra note 201, at 33.
250. Id. at 32.
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all those characteristics necessary for the preservation of their cultural
identity. ' 211
These findings, together with the Commission's determination that
Brazil violated the Yanomami's right to life, liberty, and personal se-
curity, to residence and movement, and to health and well-being, 52
amount to a ruling by the Commission that Brazil violated the Yan-
omami's right to self-determination. The Commission found the ex-
istence of this right without finding a right to independent sovereignty;
rather, the Commission effectively protected the Yanomami's right to
exist as an independent group.
Under these standards, the United States government arguably
violated the Tribes' right to self-determination by denying them what
is perhaps their last vestige of cultural identity following their sub-
jugation by white settlers: the ability to practice their religionY 3 After
Lyng, the Tribes no longer are guaranteed their ability to preserve their
cultural identity; their lives as groups could simply end.2 4
All nations have a legal duty to respect self-determination- 5 A
state cannot defeat self-determination claims with the defense of ter-
ritorial integrity unless it truly represents all its peoples.2 6 This char-
acterization is important for Native Americans. The United States is
obligated to follow the American Declaration, which includes the right
to self-determination. 2 7 Congress and the Supreme Court continually
have abrogated their duties to respect Native American self-deter-
mination: the Court by deeming Native American rights "at the suf-
ferance of Congress," 258 and Congress through the plenary power
doctrine. 9 By recognizing Native Americans as a separate people with
whom the United States Government may negotiate, the United States
cannot truly be said to represent Native Americans. Thus, Native
Americans in general, and the Tribes in particular, should be granted
international redress for violations of their right to self-determination
whenever they occur. They should not be restrained by the shackles
of domestic law as interpreted by decisions such as Lyng.
251. Id. at 31.
252. Id. at 33.
253. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
254. As previously discussed, the Tribes' culture is intimately connected to their use of
their ancestral lands. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. To deny the ability to
such use is to deny the right to maintain a cultural identity.
255. H. GRos EsPIELL, supra note 224, at 13.
256. Id. at 10.
257. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
258. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
259. See Barsh, supra note 172, at 102-10 (describing the gradual expansion of congressional
plenary power over Native American Tribes).
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B. Lyng: Apartheid for the Tribes
In addition to denying the Tribes their right to self-determination,
the United States government in the Lyng decision arguably created
a standard for religious rights so prejudicial that it can be seen as a
form of apartheid. In 1973, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Apartheid60 (Apartheid Convention), which
defines the term "crime of apartheid" as any one of six acts, including
[a]ny legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent
a racial group or groups from participation in the political, social,
economic and cultural life Qf the country and the deliberate creation
of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or
groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or
groups basic human rights and freedoms ...261
Nearly every agency and organization within the United Nations sys-
tem has been involved in the campaign against apartheid.262 The Amer-
ican Declaration recognizes the crime of apartheid as a violation of
the right to equality before the law.263
Freedom from apartheid is jus cogens because apartheid is a crime
against humanity;26 it has been denounced repeatedly and emphati-
cally as a gross violation of human rights, qualifying it as a norm of
customary international law before. the Commission.m The Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law's characterization of system-
atic racial discrimination as jus cogens2-1 can be applied to apartheid
as well as to the right of self-determination.
In an effort to define more clearly the crime of apartheid, Arthur
Goldberg, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United
Nations and former Supreme Court Justice, developed a set of prin-
ciples against which laws must be tested to determine whether they
violate international law.m "Discrimination based on race, color, na-
260. Nov. 30, 1973, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
261. Id. art. 2, at 76.
262. UNrrm) NATIONS AcTuoN iN THE FIL oF HmA Riom's, ch. 5 at 95-96, UN Doc.
ST/HR/2/Rev.3, U.N. Sales No. E.88.XIV.2 (1988). This campaign began in 1946, has been
discussed in numerous General Assembly sessions, and has been the subject of many General
Assembly resolutions. Id. ch. 5, at 96-97.
263. American Declaration, supra note 197, art. II, at 26.
264. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. II, 1970, art. l(b), at 75, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 [hereinafter War
Crimes Convention].
265. See, e.g., Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 439-40 (describing the general interna-
tional condemnation of apartheid).
266. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
267. Goldberg, The Status of Apartheid Under International Law, 13 HAsINGs CoNsT.
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tional or social origin is illegitimate in almost all circumstances" ' 6
because it denies the fundamental right of self-determination,2 69 and,
moreover, it "denies the principle of equality in dignity and rights to
which every human is entitled."270 "[R]ecognition of these universally
recognized fundamental principles imposes on States living in accor-
dance with international law the obligation to eradicate such discrim-
ination from their legal and economic systems" through positive
steps.271
Applying these principles to United States Supreme Court deci-
sions such as Lyng seems to reveal that the United States government
commits the crime of apartheid when it allows its land-use decisions
to override the basic human rights of one of its peoples. The inad-
equate protection of the Tribes' site-specific religion arguably created
a preferential standard for non-site-specific religions. 272 This discrim-
ination can be seen as violating the Tribes' right to self-determina-
tion.273 The Supreme Court in Lyng denied the equality of the dignity
and rights of Native Americans by putting governmental property
rights, even those of relatively little importance, ahead of the Native
Americans' right to practice their religion.27 4 The Lyng Court had an
opportunity to help alleviate deeply rooted historical discrimination
against Native Americans; it exacerbated that discrimination instead.
Finally, the Court ignored the positive steps that Congress took in
drafting AIRFA to eradicate discrimination against Native Ameri-
cans. 275
Recent attempts by Native Americans to use government-held land
for religious purposes have been defeated when lower courts have al-
lowed the federal government to implement land-use decisions that
adversely impact upon Native American religious practices. 276 In each
L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1985). Justice Goldberg recognized that the crime of apartheid was first defined
in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Id. at 1-5. This recognition is further evidence of apartheid's status as jus cogens.
268. Id. at 6.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. In his article, Justice Goldberg finds that the South African laws of apartheid are
inconsistent with these principles. Id. at 7-8.
272. See supra notes 163, 172-173 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part IV.A.
274. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 149-162 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (allowing the
clearing of 50 acres of forest to build ski runs); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620
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of these cases, the courts held in favor of the government because the
Native Americans could not demonstrate that the sites in question were
"indispensable" to their religions,2" despite the intrusion in each case
upon what was recognized by the court as sacred tribal land with spe-
cial geographic significance. 27 The difficult burden of proof inherent
in this indispensability standard is demonstrated by the fact that none
of the tribes in these cases was able to prevail on its claim despite the
importance of each site to its religion, and suggests that the courts
were unwilling to allow Native American claims to supersede govern-
mental land-use decisions unless absolutely necessary. Viewed in light
of these past decisions, the Lyng Court's insistence on the govern-
ment's right to "what is, after all, its land," 9 is merely a restatement
of a principle of discrimination that, has pervaded the government's
dealings with Native Americans. To the extent that Lyng supports the
principle that government land-use decisions override Native Ameri-
cans' claim to land for religious purposes, it is an example of apart-
heid.
The ramifications of both the government's treatment of the Tribes
and the Supreme Court's decision in Lyng, however, arguably extend
beyond a denial of the Tribes' right to self-determination or the com-
mitting of apartheid. Without the use of their sacred lands, the Tribes
effectively will suffer cultural genocide.
C. Lyng: Cultural Genocide or "Ethnocide" Against the Tribes
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Gen-
ocide Convention,m which defines genocide as any one of five types
F.2d 1159, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 1980) (allowing the flooding of sacred Native American burial
grounds for the construction and operation of a dam); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. supp. 785, 788
(D.S.D. 1982) (allowing the building of "roads, bridges, parking lots and other access facilities"
on "the most significant site of Lakota religious ceremonies").
277. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792.
278. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162-63; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 788.
279. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
280. Convention on the Crime and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. President Reagan signed the Genocide
Convention Implementation Act on November 4, 1988, enabling the United States to become
the ninety-eighth party to the Genocide Convention. United States: Genocide Convention
Implementation Act of 1987, 28 I.L.M. 754, 754 (1989) (Introductory Note by Christopher
Joyner). Senate approval of United States ratification of the Genocide Convention was subject
to eight attachments: two reservations, five understandings, and one declaration. Id. at 755.
The two reservations "are intended to modify the legal effects exerted by certain terms of the
Treaty." Id. The first stipulates that the International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction
over the United States under the convention unless the United States consents to appear. Id.
The second "rebuts any inference that the Treaty might confer upon the U.S. government
January 1991] NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of acts, including "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: ...
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."' 28 The Con-
vention states that genocide "is a crime under international law, con-
trary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by
the civilized world. ' 1282 Genocide is "the ultimate crime and the gravest
violation of human rights it is possible to commit." '283
Freedom from genocide has been recognized explicitly as jus co-
gens by the Commission.2 Moreover, the right to life appears prom-
inently in the major human rights instruments already discussed. 5 The
American Declaration establishes the right to life2 6 and the right to
the benefits of a culture,2 rights whose violation constitutes genocide.
As in the cases of self-determination and apartheid, the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law lists genocide as a violation of a
peremptory norm or jus cogens.28
The Draft Indigenous Rights Declaration, building on the gen-
ocide concept, sets forth the rights of indigenous peoples to protection
against "ethnocide," which it defines as "any act which has the aim
or effect of depriving [indigenous peoples] of their ethnic character-
istics or identity, of any form of forced assimilation or integration,
of imposition of foreign life styles and of any propaganda directed
against them. '" 9 When ethnocide amounts to genocide, it must be
condemned as genocide. 290
undue authority in enforcing the Convention's provisions such that they violate the safeguards
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution." Id. Under these reservations, it would be possible for
the President or Congress to commit a genocidal act, and the judiciary to be prevented from
redressing that act because it was committed pursuant to a constitutional grant of power in
the offending branch. Further, international recourse likewise could be blocked simply by the
United States government's refusal to submit to international jurisdiction.
281. Id. art. 2, at 280.
282. Id. preamble, at 278.
283. Review of Further Developments in Fields With Which the Sub-Commission has been
Concerned, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1985) [hereinafter Genocide Report]
(reporting to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
on the question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide).
284. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20, at 169.
285. See Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 430-31 & n.118.
286. American Declaration, supra note 197, art. I, at 18.
287. Id. art. XIII, at 20.
288. See RB5TATrmEN (Tinnx), supra note 227, § 702, c. (a).
289. Draft Indigenous Rights Declaration, supra note 244, at 3.
290. J. MARTmra CoBo, supra note 230, at 15-16. A report on genocide presented to the
United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
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The government's treatment of the Tribes, with the explicit ap-
proval of the United States Supreme Court in Lyng, amounts to eth-
nocide. Stripped of their lands by the United States government and
living in poverty, the Tribes have only their religion left to sustain their
culture. By effectively depriving them of their ability to practice their
religion, the Supreme Court has relegated their culture and their group
lives to the history books. When the symbols of a religion no longer
work for an individual, an inevitable sense of dissociation both from
the social nexus and from the quest for life follows. 291 When a con-
siderable number within a civilization find themselves in this predic-
ament, that civilization passes a point of no return. 29 This is the
situation the Tribes face after Lyng.
V. Implementing International Human Rights Standards in
United States Courts
The United States cannot resist the imposition of the international
$tandards discussed in this Note upon its actions with regard to the
Tribes, or any Native American tribe under similar circumstances. In
the past, the United States government has relied primarily on three
doctrines of international law interpretation to avoid enforcement of
international human rights law:293 the Act of State Doctrine, requiring
the courts of one nation to refrain from ruling on or providing relief
for acts done by another nation in its own territory; 294 the Political
Question Doctrine, requiring courts to refrain from deciding issues
more properly addressed by the legislative or executive branches;295 and
the Self-Execution Doctrine, requiring that treaties "operate of [them-
selves], without the aid of any legislative provisions" to be justicia-
ble.29 Neither these nor any other judicial doctrines may be invoked,
Minorities supports the position that "the definition of genocide should be broadened to
include cultural genocide or 'ethnocide,' and also 'ecocide."' Genocide Report, supra note
283, at 17. "Ecocide" is "adverse alterations, often irreparable, to the environment... which
threaten the existence of entire populations .... " Id. The report acknowledged that "[oither
opinions have argued that cultural etlnocide and ecocide are crimes against humanity, rather
than genocide." Id. Acceptance of this theory, however, does not affect the Tribes' claim
before the Commission; as a crime against humanity, ethnocide is still jus cogens, and it is
still a violation of the right to the benefit of a culture under the American Declaration. See
supra note 287 and accompanying text.
291. J. CAmPBELL, THE MAsKs OF GOD: CREArV E MYTHOLOGY 5-6 (1968).
292. Id.
293. See Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 445-52.
294. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
295. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
296. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829).
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however, to defeat claims of jus cogens violations. 297 Jus cogens is a
legal, not a political question, because peremptory norms are man-
datory and do not allow courts to decline judicial review. 29 Further,
jus cogens claims abrogate notions of state sovereignty: 299 "[a] claim
arising out of an alleged violation of fundamental human rights ...
would ... probably not be defeated by the act of state doctrine, since
the accepted international law of human rights is well established and
contemplates external scrutiny of such acts. '"' 0
Given the profound nature of the human rights violations in Lyng
as well as the United States' recognition and use of customary inter-
national law as binding on its domestic and international matters, the
United States could not ignore a denunciation of the Lyng decision
by an international juridical body such as the Commission.
Because the fundamental rights discussed in this Note are jus co-
gens,301 and because the United States has agreed to adhere to them,3°2
United States courts must find a way to incorporate them into their
domestic adjudication. This is not a radical or even novel idea; United
States courts already apply what amount to customary human rights
standards. 30 3 The Supreme Court has stated that "[ilnternational law
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending on it are duly presented for their determination. ' '304
Federal courts often use international law in deciding domestic is-
sues. 05 Unfortunately, not all courts have recognized this body of law
297. Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 445-56.
298. Id. at 447.
299. See id. at 446.
300. RESTATEMENT (CrIRD), supra note 227, § 443 comment (c).
301. See supra notes 225-227, 264-266, 284-288 and accompanying text.
302. The United States Government is bound to observe the obligations set forth in the
American Declaration. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 20, at paras. 46-49; see also
supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text (a petition alleging United States violations of
human rights must be framed in terms of the American Declaration). Because the Commission,
in determining the scope of human rights defined in the American Declaration, may look to
jus cogens standards for such definitions, it probably would find that the right to self-
determination and the prohibition of apartheid and genocide are all rights protected under the
American Declaration as jus cogens. See supra notes 225-227, 264-266, 284-288 and accom-
panying text.
303. Parker & Neylon, supra note 15, at 456-63.
304. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
305. The most important modern example of this principle is set forth in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the court granted jurisdiction for a tort claim
against an alien under the Alien Tort Claims Act. The court recognized that "international
law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments." Id. at 885.
The tort claim was based upon an allegation of torture, which the court recognized as a
violation of international law. Id. at 884. In arriving at the conclusion that "a state's treatment
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as binding or even influential in deciding domestic issues.3°6 Further,
many courts that appear willing to recognize international standards
narrowly interpret these standards. 307
One scholar has proposed that the solution to this problem is to
use "international human rights principles [to] guide the determination
of 'legal process' issues concerning judicial review of constitutional
rights claims."30 This "modest" approach is advanced because the
"isolationist bent of the American legal system" frustrates wholesale
incorporation of international human rights law into domestic juris-
prudence.3°9 Under this approach, "international norms would inform
the process-the analytical or methodological questions-rather than
the substance of domestic individual rights adjudication." 310 These
norms should be used "only to expand, rather than to limit, protec-
tions of individual rights under domestic law,"' 31' and would coun-
teract the "narrow view of judicial power to protect individual rights '312
that has gathered momentum in the Supreme Court since the 1970s.
This approach could have altered the outcome of the Lyng de-
cision: an interpretation of the first amendment that considers the in-
ternational human rights discussed in this Note likely would find that
the building of the G-O Road violates the Tribes' rights. Further, this
type of interpretation would protect the religious rights of other Native
American tribes in a post-Lyng environment by limiting government
land-use decisions that adversely affect religious rights. Finally, a broad
acceptance of international norms as interpretive aids to domestic law
of its own citizens is a matter of international concern," id. at 881, the Filartiga court cited
several human rights instruments, including the United Nations Charter, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, and several General Assembly resolutions. Id. at 881-83.
Filartiga is only the most prominent example of use by United States' courts of international
law. See Burke, Coliver, de la Vega & Rosenbaum, Application of International Human Rights
Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 Trx. LNr'L LAW J. 291 (1983). International law also
has been invoked in cases of indefinite detention, Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787,
798-99 (D. Kan. 1980); treatment of prisoners, Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187
n.9 (D. Conn. 1980); and in several different state decisions. Burke, Coliver, de la Vega &
Rosenbaum, supra, at 315-25. But see id. at 320 (pointing out two district court opinions that
refused to adopt the Filartiga approach of using international law to determine domestic
matters).
306. See supra note 29.
307. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812-14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.
concurring) (suggesting there should be no cause of action under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1990), for violations not recognized as international crimes in 1789). This
approach is dangerously out of touch with the needs of a rapidly changing world.
308. Strossen, supra note 28, at 805.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 805-06.
311. Id. at 806.
312. Id. at 807.
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in general would establish a more uniform application of these norms.313
Ultimately, however, such an analytical or methodological ap-
proach must be only an intermediate step to direct incorporation of
international human rights law into domestic law. To begin with, the
analytical approach focuses only on the protection of individual rights.
Many fundamental human rights (including the right to self-deter-
mination and the right to be free from genocide and apartheid), how-
ever, are collective in nature; the analytical approach would do little
to protect these group rights, which are of particular importance to
Native Americans. More importantly, although the analytical ap-
proach is more modest, and therefore more palatable, it is inadequate
because the United States has agreed to and actually is bound to pro-
tect certain fundamental rights.
Recognition of international human rights may be slow in coming.
The Supreme Court has refused to recognize international standards
in determining fundamental fights, and the Inter-American Commis-
sion has no independent enforcement mechanism.314 A declaratory
condemnation of the Lyng decision by the Commission may amount
to no more than that.
Recognition will come; however the world is becoming too small
a place for any nation to maintain an isolated, parochial view of hu-
man rights. International attention on and condemnation of human
rights violations is a necessary first step to eradicating these violations
worldwide. Recognition may come through political pressure applied
by other nations, legislation that is sensitive to violations, or greater
attention by courts to violations. Regardless of the means, however,
the United States cannot continue to demand compliance with inter-
national laws from other nations until it complies as well.
Conclusion
This Note has attempted to demonstrate that the Lyng decision
violated the Yurok, Karok, and Tulowa tribes' right to freedom of
religion under the Constitution and their human rights according to
international law. Given the fundamental nature of the rights involved,
the decision cannot be justified simply by dressing it in constitutional
garments. Further, it seems clear that United States courts currently
are not prepared to view claims from Native Americans any more fa-
313. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 192, at 752-53 (stating that, in the typical case before
the Commission, "the petitioner may expect an investigation, fact-finding, and resolution that
may represent only a moral victory").
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vorably than they have historically, despite the congressional mandate
of AIRFA to do so. It is crucial, therefore, that complaints by Native
American tribes are heard by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, so that they may obtain redress for their grievances.
It is equally crucial that the Commission take the appropriate action
to censure the United States government should it find that the Tribes'
claims, or those of any Native American tribe, are valid. Only in this
way can Native Americans' rights be suitably protected, given the cur-
rent hostile domestic environment. Perhaps most importantly, only by.
censuring all nations for violating international human rights can an
effective enforcement procedure for such rights be established.

